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Abstract 
The mental models theory has shown that the logical connectives do not always refer to the 
interpretation assigned to them by standard logic. Several papers authored by its proponents 
clearly reveal that in the cases of the conditional and disjunction. In this paper, following a 
methodology of analysis akin to that of the mental models theory, I try to check whether or 
not the same applies to conjunction, and my conclusion is that, indeed, this last connective 
can be linked to any of the sixteen possible interpretations that a logical operator relating two 
clauses can have. 
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Introduction 
A current cognitive theory, the mental models theory (from now on, MMT), has 
shown that the traditional logical connectives are not necessarily linked to the 
interpretations that classical logic often attributes to them (see, e.g., Johnson-Laird 
& Byrne, 2002, for the case of the conditional, and Orenes & Johnson-Laird, 2012, 
for the case of disjunction). Indeed, as it is well known, the truth tables of standard 
logic provide clear interpretations for such connectives. However, MMT proposes 
that there are certain pragmatic and semantic ‘modulation’ processes (see, e.g., 
Johnson-Laird, Khemlani, & Goodwin, 2015) that cause those interpretations to be 
unsuitable.  
Many examples of this are to be found in the literature on MMT, and the case of 
disjunction is very representative. Standard logic provides three possible scenarios 
in which an inclusive disjunction such as p  q (where ‘’, obviously, expresses 
inclusive disjunctive relationship) can be true: p & q, p & ¬q (where ‘¬’ is the logical 
negation), and ¬p & q. Certainly, an inclusive disjunction can be correct in three 
situations: when the two disjuncts are true (p & q), when only the first one is true (p 
& ¬q), and when only the second one is so (¬p & q). Nevertheless, the disjunctions 
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in natural language do not always admit these three possibilities. Let us think about, 
for instance, this sentence: 
“...Paco visited Paris or he visited France” (Orenes & Johnson-Laird, 2012, p. 375). 
Actually, this sentence can only be true in two of the three scenarios previously 
indicated: p & q and ¬p & q. The situation p & ¬q is, as argued by Orenes and 
Johnson-Laird (2012), eliminated by modulation, and the reason is evident. If ‘p’ 
stands for ‘Paco visited Paris’ and ‘q’ represents ‘Paco visited France’, it cannot be 
thought that Paco visited Paris and he did not visit France (p & ¬ q), since Paris is 
the capital of France. 
Something similar happens in the case of the conditional. According to classical 
logic, although they are not exactly the same as those of disjunction, there are also 
three possible combinations in which a sentence such as p → q (where ‘→’ 
represents conditional relationship) can be true: p & q, ¬p & q, and ¬p & ¬q. Thus, 
the situations are now: when both the first and the second clauses are true, when the 
first clause is false and the second one is true, and when both of them are false. 
Nonetheless, the problem is the same again. We can find conditionals in natural 
language that do not refer to the mentioned possibilities, for example,  
“If oxygen is present then there may be a fire” (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002, p. 
663). 
It is obvious that the suitable interpretation for this conditional is not that just 
indicated, but the one that Johnson-Laird and Byrne call ‘Enabling’ and that consists 
of these possibilities: p & q, p & ¬q, and ¬p & ¬q. As it can be noted, it can be 
thought that Enabling is an inverse conditional, since its truth values match those of 
a sentence such as q → p (notice, in the same way, that, apart from p & q and ¬p & 
¬q, which, as shown below, are the combinations of the biconditional, Enabling is 
true in the case in which the conditional is false, p & ¬q, and false in the case in 
which the conditional is true, ¬p & q, and, evidently, vice versa). However, what is 
important here is that, indeed, the correct interpretation of the last sentence 
mentioned above is that of Enabling or an inverse conditional, as, if ‘p’ is ‘oxygen 
is present’ and ‘q’ denotes ‘there may be a fire’, it is only possible that oxygen is 
present and there is a fire (p & q), oxygen is present and there is not a fire (p & ¬q), 
and oxygen is not present and there is not a fire (¬p & ¬q). What cannot occur is that 
oxygen is not present and there is a fire (¬p & q). 
Undoubtedly, this is a very relevant issue, since, for example, Johnson-Laird and 
Byrne (2002) identified up to ten different possible interpretations for the 
conditional, which means that, while in many cases the logical connectives can be 
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understood based on the combinations given to them in the truth tables of standard 
logic (and this is a point that even MMT seems to accept; see, e.g., Johnson-Laird, 
2012), this is not always so. Thus, in this paper, I will try to review, following the 
analysis of possibilities methodology of MMT described, another connective that, as 
far as I know, has not been studied to the same extent as the conditional and 
disjunction yet. That connective is conjunction, that is, the one that links two clauses 
by means of ‘and’ and that is often represented in logic as ‘’, and my main aim is 
to show that the interpretations corresponding to it are all of the possible 
combinations of clauses sets that can be assigned to a logical operator relating two 
clauses, that is, sixteen.  
Certainly, if we take descriptions such as that of Deaño (1999, p. 89) into account, 
we can say that, from the combinations p & q, p & ¬q, ¬p & q, and ¬p & ¬q, the 
combinations sets that can be built are sixteen, merely some examples being that 
traditionally attributed to the conditional, which, as said, is {p & q, ¬p & q, ¬p & 
¬q}, the one usually assigned to the inclusive disjunction, which, as also pointed out, 
is {p & q, p & ¬q, ¬p & q}, or that generally linked to conjunction, which is {p & 
q}. Accordingly, given that my basic goal is, as indicated too, to argue that it is 
possible to refer to all of those sets by means of natural language sentences with 
conjunctions, I will analyze in turn each of such sets and propose examples of 
conjunctive sentences in natural language for them. I begin with the one that can be 




Really, it is almost trivial to show that a conjunction can be interpreted under the 
combinations set that is attributed to it in classical logic. As it is well known, and has 
already been said, this is the usual interpretation of sentences with a structure such 
as ‘p and q’ (obviously, ‘and’ is the word in English; in other languages it is 
different), which are often represented as p  q and are related to the set {p & q}. An 
easy example can be as follows: 
This is a car and that is a bicycle 
Indeed, using a procedure akin to that why MMT describes possible scenarios (see, 
e.g., Oakhill & Garnham, 1996), it can be stated that a sentence such as this one can 
be true in a scenario such as the following: 
Car   Bicycle 
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That is, a scenario in which we can find both a car and a bicycle, or, if preferred, a 
scenario matching the set {p & q}. 
However, a conjunction with two positive conjuncts can also express a deep 
conjunction in which the second conjunct is denied. This fact leads to the second set. 
Conjunction with the second conjunct negated 
Now the set is {p & ¬q} but the point is that that set can be the interpretation, as 
indicated, of a conjunction with no negation in its conjuncts. To find an example in 
this regard it is only necessary not to forget that many times people speak in a 
figurative way. Thus, it is not uncommon to hear sentences similar to this one: 
You are a very bad person and, for this reason, people love you 
Depending on the context and the circumstances, what this sentence can be 
expressing is that people do not love you (it is said that they do ironically) because 
you are bad. So, in certain context and circumstances, the only possible scenario 
would be: 
You are a bad person People do not love you 
Nevertheless, it can also be the case that the denied conjunct is the first one. 
Conjunction with the first conjunct negated 
The set is here just the inverse of the previous one, that is, {¬p & q}, and Johnson-
Laird and Byrne’s (2002) study on conditionals can help us give an example. As 
mentioned, Johnson-Laird and Byrne (2002) proposed that, among the sixteen 
possible interpretations, ten of them could be attributed to the conditional. One of 
them was, in their view, for example, the first one that has been reviewed in this 
paper, that is, the one corresponding to the logical conjunction, i.e., to the set {p & 
q}. Nevertheless, because they were analyzing conditionals, they called the sets 
using names different from those that I am using and those that I will use below. In 
this way, they resorted to names more related to conditional relationships and called, 
following with the same example, ‘Ponens’ to the set {p & q}. 
Nonetheless, what is important for this section is that {¬p & q} is also a set of those 
that they linked to the conditional. Its name in their paper was ‘Deny antecedent and 
affirm consequent’ and one of the examples offered was: 
“If Bill Gates needs money then I’ll lend it to him” (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002, 
p. 663).
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This example is relevant because, from it, it is possible to build a conjunction related 
to {¬p & q} as well. That conjunction is the following: 
Bill Gates needs money and I will lend it to him 
It is absolutely clear that this last sentence, as well as the previous conditional, should 
not be understood literally, since it does not mean that Bill Gates needs money and 
that I will lend it to him, but that, although Bill Gates does not need money, I will 
give it to him. So, the real scenario to which the sentence refers is as follows: 
Bill Gates does not need money I give money to him 
But it is also possible to interpret that a conjunction leads to a deep structure in which 
the two conjuncts are denied. Johnson-Laird and Byrne’s (2002) work can also be 
helpful to show that. 
Conjunction with the two conjuncts negated 
Certainly, Johnson-Laird and Byrne also considered the set {¬p & ¬q} for 
conditionals. The name given by them is ‘Tollens’ and one of their examples: 
“If it works then I’ll eat my hat” (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002, p. 663). 
And, again, a conjunction can be thought from this example: 
It works and I will eat my hat 
In the two cases, the speaker means that it cannot work and that hence he/she will 
not eat his/her hat. Thus, the only possible scenario is this: 
It does not work I do not eat my hat 
And this is so, obviously, because what these sentences really express is, as 
indicated, that it is absolutely impossible that it works, the reference to the hat being 
only a way to emphasize that idea. 
These four interpretations reviewed (conjunction, conjunction with the second 
conjunct negated, conjunction with the first conjunct negated, and conjunction with 
the two conjuncts negated) are the interpretations including only one combination. 
In the next sections, I will address those corresponding to sets with more 
combinations of possibilities. 
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P 
Another set can be {p & q, p & ¬q}. Johnson-Laird and Byrne (2002) think that this 
one can be an interpretation of the conditional too, and the name they give it is 
‘Strengthen antecedent’. However, I prefer to call it just ‘P’ for at lest two reasons: 
as in other cases, Johnson-Laird and Byrne’s name appears to be suitable only for 
the conditional (it includes the word ‘antecedent’), and ‘P’ is an appropriate name 
because, in the two scenarios enabled in this set, p is true, which means that, under 
this interpretation, p is necessarily true. 
In any case, it is very easy to find examples of conjunctions that can be understood 
by virtue of this set. One of them can be clearly: 
There is a house and there may be a river 
There is no doubt that, in this example, the scenarios are these: 
House River 
House Not river 
True, the first conjunct expresses that there is a house for sure, but the second one, 
because the word ‘may’ is used, only refers to a possibility. So, the river may be and 
may not be.  
Likewise, it is not hard to imagine an example in which ‘may’ is included in the first 
conjunct, which leads us to the following interpretation. 
Q 
Indeed, in the case that that verb is in the first conjunct, the sentence cannot be linked 
to the previous set, but to {p & q, ¬p & q}, which, according to Johnson-Laird and 
Byrne (2002), represents a possible interpretation of the conditional as well. The 
name used by them is ‘Relevance’, but, as above, I name it ‘Q’ because this clause 
is always true in all of the scenarios allowed by this set. As pointed out, to think 
about examples is not difficult in this case either. It can be enough, for instance, 
simply to change the position of ‘may’ in the last sentence: 
There may be a house and there is a river 
Now, what is not known for sure and, therefore, only possible is the presence of the 
house. On the other hand, the speaker is absolutely sure there is a river. So, the 
possibilities are: 
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House River 
Not house River 
Of course, the use of ‘may’ can lead one to take the operator of possibility of modal 
logic (see, e.g., Blackburn, de Rijke, & Venema, 2010) into account in the cases of 
P and Q, and in the one of some other interpretation below. Nonetheless, analyzing 
this operator and its relationships to language is beyond the scope of this paper. As 
indicated, what is interesting here is to show that conjunction can refer to any 
combinations of possibilities between two clauses set, and, from this perspective, 
reviewing the particular words included in the conjuncts is not an essential task. 
Hence, as far as that aim is concerned, what has been argued so far can be considered 
to be enough. 
Biconditional 
It can be said that the biconditional interpretation of the conditional is habitual and 
natural for some sentences expressed with the words ‘if… then…’ Classical logic 
provides a truth table for formulae such as p  q (where ‘’ is, evidently, the 
symbol of the biconditional) that reveals that they can only be true in the cases of the 
combinations set {p & q, ¬p & ¬q}, but there is an extensive literature on the 
pragmatic phenomenon of the conditional perfection, that is, the phenomenon why a 
sentence such as p → q can be understood as p  q, just a few works addressing it 
being, for example, Auwera (1997), Horn (2000), or Moldovan (2009). MMT does 
not ignore this phenomenon either. In fact, Johnson-Laird and Byrne (2002) also 
propose that one of the ten interpretations of the conditional is the biconditional one. 
However, what I want to highlight here is that a conjunction such as p  q can be 
actually a biconditional such as p  q too. 
Really, it is not difficult to do that, since there are many sentences with conjunctions 
expressing biconditional relationships. The following is clearly one of them: 
The temperature is below zero and water freezes 
There is no doubt that this sentence only enables two possibilities: 
Below zero Water frozen 
Not below zero Not water frozen 
And this is so because it is possible neither that the temperature is below zero and 
water does not freeze nor that the temperature is not below zero and water frezees. 
So, obviously, conjunctions can also be interpreted biconditionally.  
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¬Q 
In the same way, a conjunction can transmit that the second conjunct is false (i.e., 
that q is false, or, if preferred, that ¬q is true) in all of the possible scenarios. And 
the reason of this is that some conjunctions only allow the combinations {p & ¬q, 
¬p & ¬q}. To note it, it is only necessary to remember again that people resort to 
figurative language many times. Let us think about this sentence: 
It is possible that I do that and this planet stops 
If somebody states something like that, it is clear that he/she does not mean that this 
planet will stop if he/she does that. What he/she means is that he/she is going to try 
to do something very difficult and that it is possible that he/she does it. Thus, the 
second conjunct indicating, figuratively, that the planet will stop only reveals that 
the activity or task to do is very hard, and that to do it will be quite an achievement. 
So, the only possibilities are: 
I do that This planet does not stop 
I do not do that This planet does not stop 
And the cause is, as said, that, whether or not the speaker does the activity or task, 
this planet will not stop. 
Exclusive disjunction 
The exclusive disjunction is other connective of classical logic, and its truth table 
points out that the cases in which it can be true are just those of the set {p & ¬q, ¬p 
& q}. The habitual symbol of this kind of disjunction is ‘’, and hence what I wish 
to show in this section is that some sentences with the structure p  q truly express 
p  q. A simple example is once again enough to check that. Liu and Chou used this 
exclusive disjunction in their study: 
“It is now daytime or nighttime” (Liu & Chou, 2012, p. 690). 
And, based on it, it is not complicated to build a conjunctive sentence with a similar 
sense: 
It may be daytime and it may be nighttime 
The verb ‘may’ is used here again, but what is important is that both of the two last 
sentences are related to only these scenarios: 
Daytime   Not nighttime 
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Not daytime Nighttime 
Indeed, more scenarios are not possible, as it cannot be daytime and nighttime, and, 
in the same way, it can be neither daytime nor nighttime.  
Furthermore, as an illustration, it can be added that the proponents of MMT has also 
analyzed disjunction, its habitual sense, and whether its primary interpretation is the 
inclusive one or the exclusive one in different works. Some examples are Khemlani, 
Orenes, & Johnson-Laird (2014) and Orenes and Johnson-Laird (2012). 
¬P 
This is a case akin to that of ¬Q in which the order of the conjuncts is the inverse. 
Now, the first conjunct is the one that must always be false, the second one having 
the possibility to be both true and false. So, its combinations of possibilities set is 
{¬p & q, ¬p & ¬q}, and I give it the name ‘¬P’ because, in a similar way as ¬Q, ¬p 
is necessarily true under this interpretation. 
An easy example of ¬P can be one based on that about Bill Gates in the Conjunction 
with the first conjunct negated section. The only change it is required to do is to 
introduce a possibility in the second conjunct in this way: 
Bill Gates needs money and it is possible that I lend it to him 
Given that, as commented on, the speaker and the listener know that Bill Gates does 
not really need money, what this sentence indicates is that the possibility exists that 
the speaker spends money on a Bill Gates’ product. Thus, the possible scenarios are 
the following: 
Bill Gates does not need money I give money to him 
Bill Gates does not need money I do not give money to him 
Nevertheless, a conjunction can refer to sets with three combinations too. The next 
sections show this. 
Inclusive disjunction 
As explained, the inclusive disjunction is generally represented in standard logic as 
p  q and its truth table is linked to the set {p & q, p & ¬q, ¬p & q}. The example 
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for this interpretation, which is also assigned to the conditional by Johnson-Laird 
and Byrne (2002) with the name of ‘Disabling’, can be elaborated from an instance 
of conditional sentence included in this last paper too:  
“If the workers settle for lower wages then the company may still go bankrupt” 
(Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002, p. 663). 
Certainly, the construction of a sentence with these two clauses and a conjunction is 
not difficult: 
The workers settle for lower wages and the company may still go bankrupt 
And there is no doubt that both sentences are correct in the same cases: 
Lower wages  Bankrupt 
Lower wages  Not bankrupt 
Not lower wages Bankrupt 
That is, clearly, in the possibilities of disjunction when inclusive, a connective to 
which, as indicated above, MMT has paid attention. 
Inverse conditional 
It has already been accounted for that, following Johnson-Laird and Byrne, a 
conditional can be interpreted by means of the set {p & q, p & ¬q, and ¬p & ¬q}, 
and that they call that interpretation ‘Enabling’. It has also been argued that that very 
interpretation corresponds to the one of an inverse conditional, and an example (that 
of oxygen and fire) of sentence with the structure p → q valid for those combinations 
of possibilities coming from Johnson-Laird and Byrne (2002) has been offered as 
well. 
Hence what is necessary now is to give an example of conjunction referring to that 
same set. To do that is not hard either, since Johnson-Laird and Byrne’s paper can 
be taken into account again and the example can be based on the mentioned 
conditional sentence above. In this way, the instance can be as follows: 
Oxygen is present and there may be a fire 
Obviously, the possibilities of this sentence are the same as those of the previous 
example with a conditional, that is,  
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Oxygen  Fire 
Oxygen  Not fire 
Not oxygen Not fire 
As said, these are the possible scenarios for a logical formula such as q → p. 
Nonetheless, a conjunction can be a real conditional too. 
Conditional 
It has also been explained that the set corresponding to the conditional in classical 
logic is {p & q, ¬p & q, ¬p & ¬q}, and that, for MMT, this is the usual interpretation 
of it. However, while this is so, Johnson-Laird and Byrne (2002) consider this last 
set to be just one between the ten possible interpretations of the conditional, and I 
am going to present now an example of conjunction that can be understood in 
accordance with exactly those same combinations, that is, an example of sentence 
with the structure p  q whose true logical form is p → q (for other analyses relating 
coordination to subordination, see, e.g., Culicover & Jackendoff, 1997). That 
example is this one: 
You come and I leave 
Undoubtedly, the possible scenarios for this sentence are the same as those of the 
conditional: 
You come I leave 
You do not come I leave 
You do not come I do not leave 
The reason is that the sentence appears to provide that, although it is possible that 
the speaker leaves even if the listener does not come, if the listener comes, the 
speaker necessarily will leave. The only impossible scenario being hence that the 
listener comes and the speaker does not leave. 
Otherwise, maybe it is interesting to mention here that, as in the case of disjunction, 
the literature of MMT on the conditional is also large and much more than Johnson-
Laird and Byrne’s (2002) paper. Its adherents have authored many works about it 
and its possible interpretations, and some representative examples of such works can 
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be Byrne and Johnson-Laird (2009), Khemlani et al. (2014), Quelhas, Johnson-
Laird, and Juhos (2010), or Ragni, Sonntag, and Johnson-Laird (2016). 
Sheffer function 
Other known logical connective is Sheffer function or Sheffer stroke. Its truth-values 
correspond to those of a denied conjunction and, therefore, refer to the possibilities 
{p & ¬q, ¬p & q, ¬p & ¬q}. To find a conjunction referring to these scenarios is easy 
too if the fact that people often use ironic or figurative language is taken into account 
again. Let us consider a sentence such as this one: 
Eat a lot of sweets and you will have healthy teeth 
In spite of its form and its syntactic structure, its possible scenarios are: 
A lot of sweets Not healthy teeth 
Not a lot of sweets Healthy teeth 
Not a lot of sweets Not healthy teeth 
And these are the correct possibilities for the sentence because what the speaker 
wants to state is that it is not possible to eat a lot of sweets and to have healthy teeth 
at the same time. All of the other scenarios are possible, including, of course, the last 
one, that is, not to eat a lot of sweets and not to have healthy teeth, since the former 
does not completely guarantees healthy teeth.  
Tautology 
But conjunction can also be related to the four combinations. As it is well known, in 
standard logic, when a formula is true in the four possible combinations, that is, when 
its combinations set is {p & q, p & ¬q, ¬p & q, ¬p & ¬q}, that formula is called 
‘Tautology’. This same denomination is assumed by Johnson-Laird and Byrne 
(2002), who consider that very set to be one more interpretation of the conditional. 
Once again, we can base on one of their examples to present another with a 
conjunction. According to them, this sentence is a Tautology: 
“If there are lights over there, then there may be a road” (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 
2002, p. 663). 
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Keeping the clauses, changing ‘if’ and ‘then’ by ‘and’, and including the verb ‘may’ 
in the first conjunct as well, we obtain this new sentence: 
There may be lights over there and there may be a road 
Obviously, all of the scenarios are possible here: 
Lights Road 
Lights Not road 
Not lights Road 
Not lights Not road 
It can be thought that a reason of this can be the presence of ‘may’ in the two 
conjuncts. Nevertheless, it is not clearly the only reason, since that is also the case 
in the example of Exclusive disjunction indicated above. Thus, the crucial difference 
between this last interpretation and Tautology seems to be that modulation (in the 
example given, that is, the one of daytime and nighttime, by virtue of semantic 
factors) eliminates two combinations (p & q and ¬p & ¬q) in the latter. 
Contradiction 
Finally, although it is not as easy as in the previous interpretations, examples of 
conjunctions that are false under any combination of possibilities can be found as 
well. Therefore, it is also possible to speak about an interpretation whose set is {ø} 
(where ‘ø’, of course, represents the empty set). 
Let us think about the following situation: a speaker is in a particular place but he/she 
is not paying close attention to what other people are saying. The reason is that he/she 
is analyzing a problem that he/she has in other place. When the other persons notice 
that he/she is distracted, the speaker apologizes and says: 
I am here and I am in other place 
If modulation, and, therefore, semantics and pragmatics, is taken into account, it can 
be stated that p & q is not a combination valid for this sentence, as it is impossible 
to be here and in other place at the same time. Likewise, ¬p & ¬q is not acceptable 
either, since it is also impossible neither to be here nor to be in other place at the 
same time. In the same way, ¬p & q is inadmissible too, as the speaker is really here, 
at least in a physical sense. Hence, the only remaining possible scenario would be, 
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in principle, p & ¬q (that is, I am here and I am not in other place). The problem is 
that this last option does not capture the speaker’s real intentions. The sentence is 
intended to mean that the speaker has an excuse for being absent and p & ¬q removes 
that excuse. In particular, it provides that the speaker is actually here and so he/she 
should be paying attention. Accordingly, it is difficult to accept this last combination 
too. The speaker, as indicated, wants to clarify that he/she is not truly here, and, for 
this reason, modulation can also eliminate the scenario p & ¬q. In this way, it can 
also be claimed that conjunction can refer to no combination of possibilities as well. 
Conclusion 
Therefore, it is clear that all of the sixteen interpretations that can be attributed to a 
connective by virtue of the truth tables of classical logic can be expressed by means 
of conjunctions. Everyday language includes at least sixteen kinds of conjunctions 
and each of those kinds seems to correspond to one of such interpretations. Thus, it 
can be stated that conjunction in natural language does not necessarily have the same 
characteristics as logical conjunction. This last conjunction refers to just the first 
combinations of possibilities set analyzed in this paper, and, as argued, conjunction 
in natural language can be related to other fifteen sets. In other words, and in short, 
this study shows that ‘p and q’ is not always p  q, and that the latter is only one of 
the sixteen possible interpretations of the former. 
This is a very important point, since it reveals that the general theses of MMT can 
be correct. Pragmatics and semantics cannot be ignored and it appears that what is 
essential for a sentence to be a conjunction is not that the word ‘and’ is in it. As seen, 
it is possible that the word is and the sentence is not really a conjunction. In the same 
way, there are obvious conjunctions that are not expressed by means of ‘and’. As 
also explained, Johnson-Laird and Byrne (2002) called ‘Ponens’ to the interpretation 
of the conditional that matches that of conjunction in standard logic, that is, to the 
interpretation corresponding to the set {p & q}, and, evidently, they gave some 
examples in this regard as well, one of them being this: 
“If my name is Alex then Viv is engaged” (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002, p. 663). 
There is no doubt that, if the previous sentence is said by Alex, what Alex tries to 
state is that the fact that Viv is engaged is as true as the fact that the speaker’s name 
is Alex. So, the only possible scenario is p & q, and hence the conditional is actually 
a conjunction. 
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But, if this is so and pragmatics and semantics are important to that extent, it is very 
possible that the role played by syntax is much more secondary than thought. This 
last idea seems to be one of the essential assumptions of MMT, and it is probable 
that the findings that its proponents are obtaining with their empirical research 
nowadays finally show whether or not is right.  
In any case, for the moment, although it is not accepted that semantics or pragmatics 
are more relevant than syntax in the interpretation of linguistic contents, there is at 
least a point that appears to be clear. That point is that the meanings of the words 
and the circumstances in which a sentence is said are undoubtedly decisive elements 
to understand the actual sense of a logical connective. 
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